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Recently, some two-party Authenticated Key Agreement protocols over elliptic curve based algebraic groups, in 
the context of Identity-Based cryptography have been proposed. The main contribution of this category of protocols is to 
reduce the complexity of performing algebraic operations through eliminating the need to using Bilinear Pairings. In this 
paper, we proposed two novel Identity-Based Authenticated Key Agreement protocols over non-symmetric role 
participants without using Bilinear Pairings. The results show that our proposed schemes beside of supporting security 
requirements of Key Agreement protocols, require a subset of operations with low complexity in compare with related 
protocols in this scientific area.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The Key Agreement is a cryptographic primitive 
in which communicating participants interact with each 
other in an open channel to establish a secure session key. 
In a two-party Key Agreement protocol mentioned session 
key will be shared between two participants. In the context 
of Public Key Cryptography, Key Agreement protocols 
can be appeared in the form of Certificate-Based, Identity-
Based or Certificateless cryptosystems. However, this 
paper emphasizes on Identity-Based Key Agreement 
protocols. The main advantage of Identity-Based 
cryptosystems in compare with Certificate-Based ones is 
solving the drawbacks related to complex management of 
Certification Authorities (CA) and Public Key 
Infrastructures (PKI). Adi Shamir in 1984 was the pioneer 
of the idea of Identity-Based cryptography [1]. 
The main contribution of the mentioned work 
was assuming a meaningful public key, called identity, for 
all entities. As a result, existing entities do not require to 
validate authenticity of public keys. This functionality in 
turn led to eliminating the need to certificates. Although 
this interesting solution seems to be useful in a large 
variety of applications, the lack of a practical Identity-
Based cryptosystem caused that this scientific area 
remained an open problem for many years. However, 
Boneh and Franklin could propose a fully functional and 
practical Encryption scheme in the context of Identity-
Based cryptography in 2001 [2]. 
The core function in such an applicable scheme 
was the use of a cryptographic function named Bilinear 
Pairing. The functionality of Bilinear Pairing is mapping 
an input which consists of two elements of elliptic curve 
based algebraic groups, to an element of a multiplicative 
group over finite fields [3]. Followed by proposing two 
significant pairing-based schemes, Joux’s tree-party Key 
Agreement protocol [4] and Identity-Based Encryption by 
Boneh and Franklin [2], a large variety of Identity-Based 
schemes based on Bilinear Pairings had been proposed 
including Identity-based Key Agreement Protocols [5-8]. 
Although these protocols could support many security 
requirements of Key Agreement protocols [9], high cost of 
pairing operation made them expensive from 
computational complexity perspective [10-12]. To 
overcome this drawback, we have been proposed a subset 
of Identity-Based and Certificateless Pairing-Free Key 
Agreement protocols by the use of scalar multiplication 
over elliptic curve based algebraic groups instead of 
expensive pairing operations [13-17]. In order to propose 
efficient Key Agreement protocols in this category, we 
have presented two novel Identity-Based Pairing-Free 
protocols with non-symmetric role participants 
This paper is organized as follows. In the 
following section the essential technical backgrounds are 
provided. In the third section, existing related works are 
reviewed comprehensively. Our proposed protocols are 
presented in the fourth section. Afterward, we analyzed 
our proposed Key Agreement protocols from the security 
viewpoint. In the section 6, the performance of our works 
is compared with related works. Finally, the conclusion of 
this paper is provided in the last section. 
 
Technical backgrounds 
This section presents the required backgrounds 
related to the scope of this paper. In this way, the 
following sub-section introduces the idea of Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography (ECC) [18].  
 
Elliptic curve cryptography 
Elliptic Curves are one of the fundamental 
scientific topics in many cryptographic literatures. Since 
the use of cryptographic operations over Elliptic Curve 
based algebraic groups is the basis of pairing-free Key 
Agreement protocols, this section investigates the details 
of this category of groups, briefly. If roughly speaking, 
this category of cryptographic curves are defined over a 
set of points and a binary operation, named addition, to 
generate a beneficial algebraic group. In more detail, the 
points of an Elliptic Curve over a finite field Fpn  are a 
subset of the Equation (1) by considering nonzero 
discriminant (∆= -16[4a3 + 27b2]). 
                             VOL. 11, NO. 5, MARCH 2016                                                                                                                   ISSN 1819-6608            
ARPN Journal of Engineering and Applied Sciences 
 






      (1) 
 
Here, the coefficients a and b are the elements of 
considered finite field, Fpn. Assume that (0, y0, 0) is the 
identity element of mentioned algebraic group, remained 
elements would be the solutions of the Equation. 
 
       (2) 
 
In order to explain the functionality of the 
addition operation over the mentioned curve above, two 
samples of points are considered. Without loss of 
generality, assume that two points (x1 , y1) and (x2, y2) are 
considered and (x1, y2) + (x2, y2) = (x3, y3). In this 
condition, the result is (x3, y3) = (λ2-x1-x2, λ (x1-x3) –y1). 
The value of λ can be calculated as Equation (3). 
 
           (3) 
 
A REVIEW OF IDENTITY-BASED 
AUTHENTICATED KEY AGREEMENT 
PROTOCOLS 
A subset of existing Pairing-Free Key Agreement 
protocols in the context of Identity-Based cryptography 
are reviewed in this section. The details of standardized 
Setup and Extraction phases of existing protocols are as 
followed.  
Setup: In this phase, PKG takes the required 
security parameter, and returns the confidential Master-
Key ݏ ∈ ℤ௤∗  and system parameters Params <ݍ, �௤ , ܧ �௤⁄ , ܩ, ܲ, �ܲ�� , ܪ1, ��� > which is publicly 
known to all entities. In this tuple, ݍ is a large prime 
number, �௤ is a finite field over q, and ܧ �௤⁄  is an elliptic 
curve over �௤. Moreover, ܲ refers to the generator of the 
group ܩ (a subgroup of ܧ �௤⁄ ). Finally, ܪ1: {Ͳ,ͳ}∗ × ܩ →ℤ௤∗  is a collision free hash functions and ��� is a key 
derivation function which maps considered input to the 
determined number of bits as the session-key. 
Extraction: In this phase, each entity such as � 
who possesses ܫܦ�  identifier refers to PKG to take 
corresponding Private Key. Here, PKG randomly chooses ݎ� ∈௥ ℤ௤∗ , then computes ܴ� = ݎ�ܲ and ℎ� = ܪ1ሺܫܦ� , ܴ�ሻ. 
Afterward, PKG transfers < ܴ� , ݏ� > to the entity.  After 
taking mentioned transferred message, the entity computes 
the value ℎ� = ܪ1ሺܫܦ� , ܴ�ሻ, then verifies authenticity of 
received private key, ݏ�, by checking the equality of the 
Equation (4). 
 
      (4) 
 
In continue, other phases of the considered 
Identity-Based Key Agreement protocols are explained 
separately. The final session-key would be the output of ��� function of agreed shared values and a subset of 
publicly known or transferred items.  
The Figure-1 depicts the EXCHANGE and 
COMPUTATION phases of the proposed Pairing-Free 
Identity-Based Key Agreement protocol by Cao et al. [19]. 
After computing agreed values, the session key will be 
calculated as (5) 
 
     (5) 
 
 
Figure-1. Exchange and Computation phases of Key 
Agreement protocol proposed by Cao et al. [19]. 
 
In addition, Islam et al. proposed another protocol 
in this category, which is demonstrated in the Figure-2 
[20]. Here, the session key would be computed such as 
equation (6). 
 
       (6) 
 
 
Figure-2. Exchange and Computation phases of Key 
Agreement protocol proposed by Islam  et al. [20]. 
 
Finally, the Figure-3 depicts the Exchange and 
Computation phases of proposed Pairing-Free Identity-
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Based Key Agreement protocol by Farrash et al. [21]. 
After computing agreed values, the session key will be 
calculated as (7). 
 




Figure-3. Exchange and Computation phases of key 
agreement protocol proposed by Farash et al. [21]. 
 
OUR PROPOSED KEY AGREEMENT 
PROTOCOLS 
This section describes our two proposed 
protocols in detail. These protocols are non-symmetric 
role, more precisely performing EXCHANGE phase by 
the first participant and second one are not the same 
[14].The details of SETUP and EXTRACTION phases of 
our proposed protocols are the same as what have been 
explained about these two phases in the previous section. 
Other phases of our proposed protocols are explained 
separately as followed.  
 
First proposed protocol 
Assume that two entities, A and B, are going to 
agree on a session-key. It is necessary to point out that the 
entity B (second participant), randomly choose ݌஻ ∈௥ ℤ௤∗ , 
then computes ஻ܲ = ݌஻ܲ, ݍ஻ = ݌஻ + ℎ஻′ ݏ஻ሺmod qሻ, and ܳ஻ = ݍ஻ܲ. Here,  ℎ஻′ = ܪ1ሺܫܦ஻ , ஻ܲሻ. Exchange: To explain the EXCHANGE phase, mentioned 
entities do the following: 
(1) A chooses a random ݐ஺ ∈௥ ℤ௤∗ , computes the key token ஺ܶ = ሺݐ஺ݏ஺ሻܲ = ݐ஺((ݎ஺ + ℎ஺ݏሺmod qሻ)Pሻ and sends ஺ܶ, ܴ஺ to the B entity. (2) B chooses a random ݐ஻ ∈௥ ℤ௤∗ , computes the key token ஻ܶ = ሺݐ஻ݍ஻ሻܲ = ݐ஻((݌஻ + ℎ஻′ ݏ஻ሺmod qሻ)Pሻ and 
sends ஻ܶ , ܴ஻, ஻ܲ  to the A entity. Computation: In this phase, the entities A and B are able 
to compute the shared secret as follows: 
A computes �஺஻ = [ݐ஺ݏ஺] ஻ܶ 
B computes  �஻஺ = [ݐ஻(݌஻ + ℎ஻′ ݏ஻ሺmod qሻ)] ஺ܶ 
Following equation proves that the two computed values 




Second proposed protocol 
Assume that two entities, A and B, are going to 
agree on a session key. It is necessary to point out that the 
entity A, randomly chooses ݌஺ ∈௥ ℤ௤∗ , then computes ஺ܲ = ݌஺ܲ, ݍ஺ = ݌஺ + ℎ஺′ ݏ஺ሺmod qሻ, and ܳ஺ = ݍ஺ܲ. Here, ℎ஺′ = ܪ1ሺܫܦ஺, ஺ܲሻ. Exchange: To explain the EXCHANGE phase, mentioned 
entities do the following: 
(1)  A chooses a random ݐ஺ ∈௥ ℤ௤∗ , computes the key 
token ஺ܶ = ሺݐ஺ݍ஺ሻܲ = ݐ஺((݌஺ + ℎ஺′ ݏ஺ሺmod qሻ)Pሻ 
and sends ஺ܶ, ܴ஺, ஺ܲ to the B entity. 
(2)  B chooses a random ݐ஻ ∈௥ ℤ௤∗ , computes the key 
token ஻ܶ = ሺݐ஻ݏ஻ሻܲ = ݐ஻ሺ(ݎ஻ + ℎ஻ݏሺmod qሻ)P and 
sends ஻ܶ , ܴ஻ to the A entity. Computation: In this phase, the entities A and B are able 
to compute the shared secret as follows: 
A computes �஺஻ = [ݐ஺(݌஺ + ℎ஺′ ݏ஺ሺmod qሻ)] ஻ܶ 
B computes �஻஺ = [ݐ஻ݏ஻] ஺ܶ Following equation proves that the two computed values 




SECURITY EVALUATION  
In this section we investigate the security 
requirements followed by what mentioned in [22, 23]. 
Without loss of generality, we investigated our first 
protocol. The results will be the same for second one. 
Before investigating the security requirements below, it is 
worth to note that considered adversary is able to reach the 
values �ܵ = ݏ�ܲ , �ܲ  , �ܳ  and �ܶrelated to an entity who possesses ܫܦ�identifier through eavesdropping an open channel or computing some values from some other 
possessing ones. 
Known-key security: Through the renewal 
process of computing ݐ஺ and ݐ஻, the value of session-key in new session would be unique and independent in 
compare with the value of session-key in last session. 
Therefore, any subset of possessing session-keys does not 
help the adversary to compute the next session-key. 
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Forward secrecy: By assuming that adversary 
compromises the values  ݏ஺ and ݏ஻, it is not possible to reach the value of session-key. Obviously, computing the 
value of the shared session-key, ሺݐ஺ݐ஻ݍ஺ݏ஻ሻܲ, requires to reach the values ݐ஺ or ݐ஻. However, the discrete logarithm problem makes the mentioned adversary unable to 
compute the final value of session-key.   
Perfect forward secrecy: Here, it is assumed 
that the adversary knows the value of Master-key, ݏ, 
beside of the values ݏ஺ and ݏ஻. The same reasons mentioned in “forward secrecy” property are sufficient to 
prove that the proposed protocol(s) support(s) “perfect 
forward secrecy” property.  
Key-compromise impersonation: An adversary 
who possesses the value ݏ஺is unable to impersonate the entity B to A. the reason is that possessing the values ݏ஺ and ஺ܶ = ሺݐ஺ݏ஺ሻܲ leads to reach value ݐ஺ܲ. By assuming that adversary is able to compute the value ஻ܶ = ሺݐ஻ݍ஻ሻܲ , it is impossible to compute the value of final session-key, ሺݐ஺ݐ஻ݍ஺ݏ஻ሻܲ. The reason is that computing the value ሺݐ஺ݍ஻ሻܲ which can be driven from session-key (because adversary possesses the values ݏ஺ and ݐ஻), while adversary possesses the values ݐ஺ܲ and ݍ஻ܲ (and not ݐ஺ and ݍ஻) requires solving one of the mathematical hard problems 
named Computational Diffie Hellman (CDH) which is 
impractical in polynomial time.  
Unknown key-share resilience: Here, it is 
assume that adversary possesses the publics, while tries to 
impersonate entity B to A.  Mentioned reasons for 
supporting “key-compromise impersonation” in which 
adversary was able to reach more values (includingݏ஺) is sufficient to support “unknown key-share resilience”.  
Key control: This property emphasizes on 
making communicating parties in predetermination of the 
session-key. Since, the value of session-key in any 
session, ሺݐ஺ݐ஻ݍ஺ݏ஻ሻܲ, depends on the values ݐ஺ and ݐ஻, a cheating participant is unable to predetermine the value of 
session-key in the next sessions. 
Unknown session-specific temporary 
information: Here, it is assumed that the vales ݐ஺ and ݐ஻ are leaked and the adversary knows them. Hence, 
computing the value ሺݏ஺ݍ஻ሻܲ is enough for the adversary who just possesses the values ݏ஺ܲ and ݍ஻ܲ (and not ݏ஺ and ݍ஻). Computation of mentioned values above requires solving one of the mathematical hard problems named 
Computational Diffie Hellman (CDH) which is impractical 
in polynomial time. 
 
PERFORMANCE COMPARISONS  
This section shows the excellence of our 
proposed protocols in compare with other existing related 
works. Since improving the efficiency is one of the 
challenging issues for key agreement protocols [24] this 
section shows that our proposed scheme is considerably 
more efficient than other proposed ones in this scientific 
are. The focus of this comparison is on the total 
computational cost during the increase in the number of 
established sessions. The main reason for proposing such a 
comparison is that in the considered works, there exist 
some computations which must be performed once.  
Hence, when the number of established sessions 
is grown, the overall computational cost of the mentioned 
works will be different. Before starting the comparison 
based on this method, it is important to learn about the 
computational costs of operations. Table 1 represents 
computational costs of various operations [25]. In this 
table, the complexity of executing modular multiplication 
is considered as a meter of estimating other operations' 
complexities.  
 




Based on what explained above and given 
information in Table-1, Table-2 shows the computational 
complexity of utilized operations as a function of the 
number of established sessions in the considered works. 
Based on Table-2, Figure-4 illustrates the difference of 
overall computational costs among considered works 
during the growth of number of established sessions. It is 
apparent from the Figure-4 that our work is effectively less 




Figure-4. Computational complexity growth of considered 
protocols. 
Table-2. Performance comparison during the growth of number of the established sessions. 
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Nowadays, pairing-free cryptography became an 
active scientific topic especially in the area of 
Authenticated Key Agreement protocols. The main reason 
is that Bilinear Pairings impose high complexity of 
computations which leads to lower performance in 
compare with pairing-free ones. In this paper, we could 
propose two novel Identity-based two-party Key 
Agreement protocols over Elliptic Curves that have better 
performance in compare with existing related works from 
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